Rethinking counterterrorism after Mumbai

By RICHARD FALK

2008 DECEMBER 11

Source: JUST Commentary, Vol. 9 No. 1 January 2009

The ferocity of the terrorist assault on an array of highly symbolic targets in Mumbai on November 26-29 produced many instant comparisons to the 9/11 al Qaeda attack more than seven years ago. There were far fewer casualties in Mumbai and there was nothing comparable to the spectacular live TV image of a hijacked commercial plane crashing into the Twin Towers or the later collapse of both buildings. Also India, although a rising regional superpower did not occupy the pinnacle of global power as was the case with the United States.

In other respects the comparison is not misguided. The TV pictures of the mayhem and fires consuming the Taj Mahal Palace Hotel, the most famous landmark in the great city of Mumbai, was also spectacular, and the continuing TV coverage over the 60 hours of terrorist violence, and ensuing struggle, ensured that the attack would long be inscribed in the political consciousness of a massive global audience that watched in real time as the blood-soaked drama unfolded. As well, the startling revelation that only ten attackers split into teams of two could mount simultaneous assaults on several high profile targets bringing a major city to its knees underscored the acute vulnerability of modern states to skilled terrorist assaults. It also highlighted the frightening shift in terrorist tactics from symbolic bloodshed to an all out effort to kill as many civilians as possible, often ethnically coded, as at Mumbai to select Hindus, Westerners, and Jews as priority targets. We can only tremble to think what 100 or more similarly trained and armed terrorists might do in virtually any crowded urban center anywhere on the planet.

The evidence conclusively shows that the attack was launched by extremists operating from Pakistani territory, seemingly with the acquiescence, if not the complicity, of elements of the Islamabad government. Under these circumstances, concern about a provocative Indian military response has shaped world diplomacy. With unacknowledged irony, the American Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice rushes to India to urge calm, and then to Pakistan to insist on full cooperation with the Indian enforcement efforts, partly to head off an inter-governmental military confrontation and partly to avoid shifting Pakistani army units away from the Afghan border region. The irony arises because the United States embarked on a response to 9/11 premised on just the sort of logic that Rice is rightfully fearful of in the India/Pakistan inflamed setting. President Bush set the tone for the American response in his September 20, 2001 speech to a joint session of the U.S. Congress initiating the “war on terror” a few days after 9/11: “...we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism.” And further, “Every nation in every region now has a decision to make: Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.” Afghanistan and Iraq were deemed “with the terrorists” and were subjected to an all out “shock and awe” military onslaught with goals that went far beyond counterterrorism, seeking “regime change” and overall political restructuring. From the perspective of late 2008, it seems clear that when Bush launched the “war on terror” he put the United States on a self-destructive path that produced two costly and inconclusive wars in Afghanistan and Iraq that greatly intensified anti-Americanism around the world and undermined the reputation of the United States as benevolent global leader. Obama’s electoral success in part expressed the hope that the United States would now choose a different approach to security in the face of global terrorist threats.

The United States government should have reconsidered the thinking behind its 9/11 response much earlier in light of the formidable obstacles encountered both in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is late to do so but not too late. The American diplomatic initiative is mainly designed to make sure that India does not react militarily to the Mumbai attacks. We should realize that President Elect Obama promised not only to end America’s combat role in Iraq War but more significantly to repudiate “the mentality” that led to warfare as the crux of counterterrorism. All along, it was difficult to know exactly what Obama meant when he referred to mentality. He had made clear that despite his opposition to the Iraq War, he favored the Afghanistan War, and argued repeatedly for an escalation of the American military presence in Afghanistan. Part of his criticism of the Iraq policy was that it was misrepresented from the outset as countering a terrorist threat, which he rightly regarded as non-existent however objectionable was the regime of Saddam Hussein. Given Obama’s reasoning, to wage war in Iraq was a misguided distraction from Afghanistan where he believed the genuine terrorist threat was lodged. From this perspective it would seem that Obama is not likely to renounce a “war on terror” but rather is determined to recalibrate the war on terror so as to reduce the threat of future catastrophic terrorism.

In this regard, we can expect a partial revision of American counterterrorist policy, likely a series of tactical moves that would supposedly substitute the “smart” counterterrorism of a Democratic presidency for the “dumb” counterterrorism of the Bush era. While this shift has certain important benefits it fails to abandon the dubious core conviction that foreign counterinsurgency wars are effective and necessary instruments of policy in this post-colonial era. The cast of lead players that Obama has so far assembled for his cabinet adds to my worry that counterinsurgency remains alive and well in future American foreign policy. The new Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton, as well as the Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, and the National Security Advisor, James Jones, are all uncritical adherents of counterinsurgency doctrine and warfare, as well as onetime supporters of the Iraq War. The bipartisan admiration for General David Petraeus derives from his impressive rewriting of a counterinsurgency approach. What is ignored in this advocacy of an escalated military effort in Afghanistan is that since Vietnam no major counterinsurgency undertaking has ended in victory for the foreign intervenor. This unheeded experience is not only applicable to the United States. The Soviet failures in Afghanistan during the 1980s are indicative of the irrelevance of military superiority, as was the unexpected inability of Iraq’s mighty war machine to reverse the outcome of the Iranian Revolution in the 1980s. Foreign counterinsurgency operations although highly destructive are no match for determined nationalist resistance, and until this lesson is learned strategic mistakes will continue to be made by major states acting on the global stage.

Even if such efforts to use superior military force to change the political future were effective there would be other reasons to oppose such policies. For one thing, foreign intervention without an authorization from the UN Security Council violates international law and undermines the authority of the UN. This is one of the major costs of the Iraq War. For another, the devastation caused by high technology weaponry of the intervening power inflicts enormous damage, measured by casualties, displaced persons, and infrastructure devastation. Finally, to reconfigure the political future of a foreign country, especially when the intervenor is from the North and the society at risk is in the South does move the world closer to “a clash of civilizations,” as well as exhibiting a disregard for the most fundamental of all human rights, the right of self-determination that is to be enjoyed by all peoples.

Yet the threats of transnational extremist violence cannot be ignored, and it would be as unreasonable for the Indian Government to shrug their shoulders as it would be for India to mount a large-scale military attack on Pakistan. India had been subjected to past terrorist attacks, and can only expect more to come. Besides Pakistan is on the Indian border, and to the extent that the Islamabad government uses extremists to carry out such deadly missions would certainly seem to confer on India the right to take reasonable steps in self-defense.

In this sense, Rice’s advice to both governments is appropriate to prevent an upward, dangerous cycle of violence between these two nuclear weapons states. The best short-term outcome would be a zealous effort by the Pakistani Government to suppress the Lashkar-e-Taiba (army of the pure) and to arrest those among its membership who can be shown to have acted to facilitate the Mumbai operation. Pakistan should also accede to the Indian request to extradite the twenty individuals suspected of past terrorist and criminal activities directed at India, provided evidence of their involvement is given to Pakistani authorities. At the same time it would be important to couple these security moves with continued efforts to look beyond the crisis and mood of the moment, and to signal an intention to revive efforts to improve diplomatic relations between the two countries.

But what if Pakistan is unable or unwilling to do this to a degree that satisfies the security concerns of New Delhi? Pakistan has already taken some steps in response to the pressure applied, but so far this effort is ambiguous to such a degree that India will certainly demand more forthcoming and substantial counterterrorist actions to be taken. And likely Islamabad will falter at that point either because the government is too weak, or because its grievances against India are believed to be so great that it is unwilling to give ground, regardless of consequences. Then what? This is when the calls for moderation will probably go unheeded, and India will take action, and at the very least attack Lashkar training camps, and possibly strongholds of Muslim extremism. Already the government in Pakistan is being severely criticized domestically for its refusal to stand up to India and for its seeming readiness to do whatever Washington insists upon. It could collapse if it accommodates India to any further extent. If this analysis is generally correct, it promises a bleak future for the region.

But there is another way for India, and for the United States. It relies to the extent possible on law enforcement, strengthened by inter-governmental cooperation. In some circumstances, such an effort will be stymied by a government that refuses to cooperate, as may turn to be the case for Pakistan, making it reasonable for India to mount low profile special forces operations in Pakistan that are specifically designed to eliminate terrorist capabilities to mount attacks. But most important of all, an alternative approach must be attentive to legitimate grievances. In this instance, there are two that stand out: first, take measures to end the pervasive discrimination in India against the minority Muslim population of 150 million; it is reliably reported that Indian Muslims endure a standard of living significantly below that of impoverished Hindu “untouchables.” Muslim communities have been the targets of periodic riots, even massacres, and are denied anything approaching proportional representation in the Indian governmental civil service. And secondly, seek a solution for Kashmir that respects the right of self-determination for the Kashmiris that includes credible security guarantees and autonomy arrangements for the Hindu, Sikh, and Buddhist minorities and regions.

There may be no soft landing for restored security in the 21st century. Mumbai dramatizes the persistence of large-scale terrorist threats and clarifies the great risks of relying on a militarist response. Similarly, the U.S. response to 9/11 has established negative precedents for meeting counterinsurgency threats. Although the context was vastly different, the Spanish response to the Madrid train bombings of March 11, 2004 are suggestive. It was expressed by the demonstrations that followed the terrorist attack: “No to War, No to Terrorism.” Responding to this public opinion, the Spanish government withdrew its forces from the Iraq War, and greatly enhanced its effort to rely on law and police methods to address future threats. So far the results have been positive. This Spanish model can and should be adapted to the circumstances of India, and the United States. If such a course is taken, we can expect less violence and more security; if not, more violence and less security.

Richard Falk is professor emeritus of international law at Princeton University, writer, speaker, activist on world affairs, and the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories.

Web link:

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