The Philippines: The Collapse of Peace in Mindanao

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

ASIA BRIEFING NO. 83 | 23 OCTOBER 2008

MEDIA RELEASE

Jakarta/Brussels, 23 October 2008: A new Supreme Court ruling has ended hope of a peaceful resolution in the near future to the decades-old conflict between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Philippines government.

The Philippines: The Collapse of Peace in Mindanao, the latest briefing from the International Crisis Group, says the immediate task now is to prevent escalation of fighting and discourage the government and local officials from arming civilians. Interested governments and donors should press both sides to keep existing ceasefire mechanisms in place, while quietly urging a return to talks.

“Peace talks have broken down before but never in this way, with government institutions and the political elite fundamentally rejecting the achievements of the negotiators. It will be much harder this time, even if talks resume, to simply pick up from where they left off”, says Sidney Jones, Crisis Group Senior Adviser.

The court ruling on 14 October, preceded by an injunction on 4 August, effectively killed an extraordinary Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain that was the culmination of eleven years’ negotiation. It acknowledged the Muslims of Mindanao, the Bangsamoro, as a First Nation and gave wide powers to the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) that was to be set up as their homeland. The agreement was negotiated with little public consultation, and when the extent of the BJE’s proposed territory was revealed—even though affected communities were to be offered a chance to opt in or out in a plebiscite—local officials demanded the signing be stopped.

A few MILF “renegade” commanders then launched attacks on civilians and the military responded with “punitive actions” against them. Renewed fighting has claimed some 100 civilian lives and displaced some 390,000 but remains largely restricted to areas where these commanders operate. Several factors are militating against a return of the two sides to all-out war, but the Supreme Court ruling and the sense that the strategy of talking peace has failed could lead other commanders to join the “renegades”.

“Both sides need to learn lessons from this debacle”, says John Virgoe, Crisis Group’s South East Asia Project Director. “The government needs to be more engaged with its own negotiating team, head off potential spoilers through consultation or cooptation, and be prepared to deliver what it promises. The MILF needs to show more backbone in dealing with errant commanders”.

Contacts:

Andrew Stroehlein (Brussels) +32 (0) 2 541 1635

Kimberly Abbott (Washington) +1 202 785 1601

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REPORT OVERVIEW

On 14 October 2008 the Supreme Court of the Philippines declared a draft agreement between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Philippines government unconstitutional, effectively ending any hope of peacefully resolving the 30-year conflict in Mindanao while President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo remains in office. The Memorandum of Agree­ment on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD or MOA), the culmination of eleven years’ negotiation, was originally scheduled to have been signed in Kuala Lumpur on 5 August. At the last minute, in response to petitions from local officials who said they had not been consulted about the contents, the court issued a temporary restraining order, preventing the signing. That injunction in turn led to renewed fighting that by mid-October had displaced some 390,000.

The immediate task now is to prevent escalation and discourage the government and local officials from plans to arm civilians. Interested govern­ments and donors should press both sides to keep existing ceasefire mechanisms in place, while quietly urging a return to talks. They can also take steps now to build or strengthen the institutions that a post-conflict Mindanao will need, even if peace seems a long way off.

The MOA was an extra­ordinary document intended as a roadmap for a so-called Comprehensive Compact or final peace treaty. It acknowledged the Muslims of Minda­nao, the Bangsamoro, as a First Nation and laid the groundwork for setting up a Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as their homeland. The BJE’s relationship with the central government was defined as “associative”, suggesting almost-equals. This, and the definition of ancestral domain, the territory to be included in the BJE, were the most controversial parts of the agreement. The revelation of the planned geographic scope led outraged local politicians, whose land would be affected and who had not been consulted during the negotiations, to demand an injunction. President Arroyo’s opponents and potential successors after the 2010 elections also saw political advantage to be gained from condemning the MOA.

Once the injunction was granted, the president and her advisers announced the dis­solution of the govern­ment negotiating team and stated they would not sign the MOA in any form. Instead they would consult directly with affected communities and implied they would only resume negotiations if the MILF first disarmed.

In the past when talks broke down, as they did many times, negotiations always picked up from where they left off, in part because the sub­jects being discussed were not particularly controversial or critical details were not spelled out. This time the collapse, followed by a scathing Supreme Court ruling calling the MOA the product of a capricious and despotic process, will be much harder to reverse.

While the army pursues military operations against three “renegade” MILF comman­ders— Ameril Umbra Kato, Abdullah Macapaar alias Bravo, and Aleem Sulaiman Pangalian— who attacked villages in North Cotabato and Lanao del Norte after the August injunction, the likelihood of full-scale war engulfing Mindanao seems low. Neither side has the resources to engage in sustained combat, and the generally moderate MILF leadership said after the 14 October ruling that it would not order its forces into battle. A few other individual commanders, however, could conclude that the strategy of pursuing peace had failed and join the “renegades”. Another possibility is that some of the few dozen foreign, mostly Indonesian, jihadis in Mindanao could decide to undertake retaliatory action, since Kato and Bravo have assisted them in the past. A major urban bombing could turn trigger a much wider conflict.

Looking ahead, if and when peace talks resume, the government will have to do a better job of heading off potential spoilers, through con­sultation or co-optation, and delivering what it promises. The MILF will have to show more backbone in dealing with errant commanders.

FULL REPORT

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The INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP (Crisis Group) is an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation, with some 135 staff members on five continents, working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict. The Crisis Group is generally recognised as the world’s leading independent, non-partisan, source of analysis and advice to governments and intergovernmental bodies on conflict prevention and resolution.